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NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
UNDER SECTION 1981
INTRODUCTION
Section 19811 guarantees "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States . . . the same right ... to make and enforce contracts
... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens."'2 The statute prohibits discrimination 3 both by private
parties4 and by state action. 5 Enacted in the aftermath of the Civil
War, section 1981 was primarily intended to eliminate the legal dis-
abilities6 imposed on the recently freed slaves by the Southern states'
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1981 was originally enacted as the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. It was subsequently re-enacted as § 16 of
the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144. The original version of
the 1866 Act protected both contractual and property rights from discrimination.
However, this version was subsequently recodified into two statutes, the current
versions of which are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Today, §
1981 applies to contractual rights, while § 1982 applies to property rights. See infra
note 125 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
3. 1 C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 32, at 50 (2d ed. 1980) ("Generally
stated, it is only necessary that a plaintiff protected [under § 1981] show that he or
she was unlawfully denied one of the rights indicated in the statute by the defend-
ant."). Some courts state that a plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination
but merely discriminatory impact. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334,
1340 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Boston Chapter,
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975); see Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975).
However, other courts have held that a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent
based on a reading of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), requiring proof of
intent under the fourteenth amendment. See Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police
Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 268 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454
U.S. 1140 (1982); Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
cariam). See generally Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportion-
ate Impact?, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 137 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Discriminatory
Purpose or Disproportionate Impact].
4. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
437 (1968) (companion statute to § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980),
also prohibits acts of discrimination by private parties).
5. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16 (1883); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson,
Employment Discrimination § 88.10, at 18-5 to 18-6 (1982); see Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948); 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 19, at 34;
cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1948) (§ 1982 is directed at governmental
action).
6. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872).
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"Black Codes."' 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has frequently char-
acterized section 1981 as proscribing discrimination based on race.,
The Court has, however, construed section 1981 to apply to race
discrimination directed at groups other than blacks; the statute has
been interpreted to protect whites9 and aliens' 0 as well. Still unan-
swered, however, is the question whether a national origin discrimi-
nation" claims are cognizable under section 1981.12 This issue is the
subject of disagreement among lower federal courts;' 3 they apply four
distinct approaches in determining whether a national origin discrimi-
nation claim states a cause of action under the statute. "4
7. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1968); Ortiz v. Bank of
Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982). See generally 3 A. Larson & L.
Larson, supra note 5, § 88.10; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional
Law 688 (1978). The Black Codes were racially discriminatory state laws which had
severely curtailed blacks' civil rights. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
427 (1968).
8. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (holding
that § 1981 applies to "racial discrimination against white persons"); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) ("§ 1981 affords a federal
remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race"); Georgia
v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) (emphasizing "the racial character of the rights
being protected").
9. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976).
10. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948); see Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). An alien is a foreign-born
U.S. resident who has not been naturalized and is still a subject or citizen of a foreign
country. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 53 (1976); see 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) (1976).
11. While the meaning of national origin discrimination has not been defined by
the courts in the context of § 1981, it has been generally defined as discrimination
directed at an individual because of the "country where a person was born, or
... the country from which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). In the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), national origin discrimination
has been defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as discrimina-
tion directed at an individual "because of [his or her], or his or her ancestor's place of
origin; or because [he or she] has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of
a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1982).
12. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 n.6 (1980).
13. See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 559 (E.D. Cal.
1982); Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
14. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560-62, 562 n.20 (E.D. Cal.
1982). Generally, most courts that reject a national origin discrimination claim state
that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See, e.g.,
Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Gomez v.
Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D. Ariz. 1976). Some courts, however, refer to
the plaintiff's lack of "standing" in dismissing national origin discrimination claims
under § 1981. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, 593 F.2d 968, 969 (10th Cir.
1979); see also 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 71.10 (discussing standing
under § 1981).
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One group of courts concludes that section 1981 applies only to race
discrimination claims and does not provide a cause of action based on
national origin discrimination.' 5 A second approach finds that claims
of national origin discrimination are sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss, but requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the alleged dis-
crimination was based on race rather than national origin.16 A third,
"pragmatic approach," construes section 1981 to protect only those
national origin groups that are commonly perceived as "non-white"
and have traditionally been the victims of group discrimination. 17 The
fourth category of cases rejects the racial standard altogether and
holds that a plaintiff may state a valid claim under section 1981 based
on either national origin or race.' 8
Part I of this Note reviews the judicial interpretations of section
1981 by both the Supreme Court and lower courts. Part II exposes the
inconsistencies resulting from the incorporation of a racial test that
limits cognizable claims under section 1981 and examines the lan-
guage and legislative history of section 1981. This Note suggests that
the primary concern of Congress more than 100 years ago to protect
blacks should not be dispositive for limiting the statute to race dis-
crimination claims today. Finally, this Note concludes that because
section 1981 has been construed broadly enough to protect both
whites and aliens, it is inconsistent to construe the statute strictly so as
to preclude claims by identifiable national origin groups. This conclu-
sion is in keeping with the general policies of the fourteenth amend-
ment, upon which section 1981 rests in part, which considers discrimi-
nation based on race and national origin equally egregious.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1981
A. The Supreme Court
Historically, section 1981 claims addressed by the Supreme Court
have primarily been brought by black plaintiffs.' 9 However, in
15. E.g., Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D. Ariz. 1975); Jones
v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
16. E.g., Trehan v. IBM Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 443, 445
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 383 (S.D. Ala.
1979); Martinez v. Hazelton Research Animals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186, 187-88 (D.
Md. 1977).
17. E.g., Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134, 466
F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. I1. 1979); Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135, 139
(N.D. Ill. 1977); see Maldonado v. Broadcast Plaza, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 839, 839-40 (D. Conn. 1974).
18. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see, e.g.,
LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978);
Samuel v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,643, at 6700
(D.V.I. 1975).
19. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 163 (1976); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
1983]
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McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 20 the Court held
that the statute also protects whites from racial discrimination.2' The
Court emphasized that "the statute explicitly applies to 'all per-
sons."'' 22 Furthermore, the Court rejected a "mechanical reading" of
the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" that would limit the class
of section 1981 plaintiffs to non-whites.23 It emphasized that the
legislative history of the phrase24 demonstrates that the phrase was
"viewed simply as a technical adjustment without substantive ef-
fect" 25 and thus was simply meant "to emphasize the racial character
of the rights being protected." 2
Despite the Supreme Court's characterization of the rights pro-
tected as racial, the Court has also interpreted section 1981 to apply to
aliens. 27 The decisions are unclear, however, whether aliens can state
a claim of alienage-based discrimination or are limited to claims of
racial discrimination.2 8 Thus, under the Supreme Court's interpreta-
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 433 (1973); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 783 (1966); cf.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968) (§ 1982 claim).
20. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In McDonald, three employees, one black and two
whites, were charged with misappropriating company property, but only the white
employees were discharged. Id. at 275-76.
21. Id. at 296; see B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law
610 (1976) ("Unanswered was the question whether § 1981 would be applied to
discrimination on a basis other than race, such as national origin .....
22. 427 U.S. at 287 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)); see Comment,
Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 29, 74 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
24. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115, 157 app. (1866).
25. 427 U.S. at 291.
26. Id. at 293 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)).
27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948); see Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Originally § 1981 applied
only to "citizens" of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat.
27. In 1870, § 1981 was amended, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144, to
extend "the operation of the civil rights bill ... to all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States." Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (remarks of Sen.
Stewart).
28. E.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948)
("section [1981] and the Fourteenth Amendment on which it rests in part protect 'all
persons' against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of
alienage or color"); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 21, at 265; see Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at
91-92. Most lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions as prohibit-
ing discrimination merely based on a person's status as an alien. Ramirez v. Sloss, 615
F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1980); Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811, 814
(7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) 408
F. Supp. 916, 928 n.17 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Guerra
v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974); see Jones v. United Gas Improve-
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tion, blacks, whites and aliens are afforded protection under section
1981. The extent of the protection, however, is still unclear.
Although the Supreme Court has made frequent references to the
racial character of the rights protected under section 1981,29 it has
never defined the term "race." 30 This may be explained in light of the
nature of the litigants before the Court in those cases in which these
references were made; the plaintiff was either black or white and had
specifically alleged racial discrimination.3 1 The absence of a clear
definition of the term "race" has resulted in inconsistent approaches
by the lower federal courts for determining when a plaintiff has been
subjected to "racial discrimination. ' 32 Furthermore, courts disagree
whether the Supreme Court's characterization of the racial discrimi-
nation prohibited should be interpreted as excluding other forms of
discrimination, 33 such as national origin discrimination.3 4
ment Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see B. Schlei & P. Grossman,
supra note 21, at 265 ("§ 1981 might only provide protection to aliens who can
contend that the discrimination was racial in character."). See infra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287
(1976); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
30. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 556, 565 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
31. Id. at 556; see, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
275-76 (1976) (white plaintiffs); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1976)
(black plaintiffs); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975)
(black plaintiff); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 783 (1966) (same); Comment,
Mexican Americans: Are They Protected By The Civil Rights Act Of 1866?, 20 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 889, 895-96 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Americans].
32. See infra pt. I(B).
33. The lower courts have held that sex and age discrimination are not prohib-
ited by § 1981. See Kodish v. United Airlines, 463 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (D. Colo.
1979) (age discrimination), aff'd 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1980); Thomas v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (sex discrimina-
tion); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D. Mo. 1974)
(same), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has summarily
stated, in dictum, that § 1981 does not proscribe discrimination based on sex or
religion. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) ("§ 1981 is in no way
addressed to such categories of selectivity" as discrimination based on religion or sex).
But see Marlowe v. General Motors Corp., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1160,
1161 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (religious discrimination against Jews is tantamount to racial
discrimination and thus prohibited under § 1981), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973). Whether "ethnic" plaintiffs should be able
to recover under § 1981 on the further ground that they were discriminated against
on the basis of their sex, age or religion is beyond the scope of this Note.
34. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 559 (E.D. Cal. 1982); 3
A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 71.10; 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 23.
Compare Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (plaintiff's
membership in a distinct group subject to discrimination is protectible) with Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 10-15 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Spanish-
surnamed plaintiff's discrimination claim based on national origin is not protectible).
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B. The Lower Courts
Most lower courts have interpreted section 1981 as proscribing only
racial discrimination and accordingly have refused to allow claims
based solely on national origin.3 5 Some justify this interpretation by
reference to the historical framework in which the statute was passed.
These courts emphasize that because section 1981 was originally en-
acted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment,36 it is directed solely at
racial discrimination.3 7 Other courts interpret the phrase "as is en-
joyed by white citizens" to limit the proper class of litigants under
section 1981 to "non-whites. '3 8 In addition, many courts rely upon
Supreme Court characterizations of the "racial" rights protected by
section 1981 to exclude national origin claims.39
The most restrictive approach provides that a plaintiff who does not
allege racial discrimination fails to state a claim under the statute,40
35. See, e.g., Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa.
1978); Vazquez v. Werner Continental, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 513, 515 (N.D. III. 1977);
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D.D.C.
1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d
76 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D.
Ariz. 1975); see also 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 94.10, at 20-11.
36. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 88.10; see Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 170 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968);
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
37. E.g., Saad v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978);
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D.D.C.
1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d
76 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kurylas v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp.
1072, 1075-76 (D.D.C. 1974), afJ'd mem., 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see 3 A.
Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 71-10, at 13-21.
38. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 11-12 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966) which construed the phrase
as emphasizing the racial character of the rights protected); see Lobos v. Aeromexico,
18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8886, at 5661 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Enriquez v. Honeywell
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Kurylas v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 514 F.2d 894
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 60, 343 F.
Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. La. 1972) (quoting Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98, 99 (D.
Md.), afj'd per curiam, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960)); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson,
supra note 5, § 94.10, at 20-12 to 20-13.
39. See, e.g., Pollard v. City of Hartford, 539 F. Supp. 1156, 1164 (D. Conn.
1982); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 452 F.
Supp. 1127, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Eggleston v.
Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610,
612 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 11-12
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
40. E.g., Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Mouriz v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. La.
1977); Boling v. National Zinc Co., 435 F. Supp. 18, 20 (N.D. Okla. 1976); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd
mem. sub nom. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
924 [Vol. 51
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and therefore refuses to recognize a claim based on national origin.
Furthermore, even if a national origin plaintiff does allege "racial"
discrimination, his claim is likely to be dismissed because many courts
construe the term "race" narrowly. For example, East Indians, Mexi-
can-Americans, Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic and Spanish-sur-
named persons have tried to assert "race" discrimination claims, yet
have been unsuccessful under this approach because technically they
were Caucasian, and their discrimination claim was considered to be
based solely on national origin. 41 In particular, one court dismissed a
claim by an East Indian because he failed to provide "factual support"
for his assertion that he was "Black."
42
These same groups, however, have been protected by other courts
under more expansive interpretations of the racial test.43 Some courts
implicitly recognize that individuals of certain national origin groups
1977); Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D. Ariz. 1975);
Kurylas v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd mem., 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see LaMont v. Forman Bros., 410
F. Supp. 912, 918 (D.D.C. 1976); Easley v. Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343, 344 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D. Mo.
1974), af'd, 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).
41. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see, e.g.,
Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Black East Indian of African descent); Wald v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 24
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 616, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (Jewish); Hiduchenko v.
Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic Center, 467 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Minn. 1979)
(Ukrainian); Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 128-29 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (Hispanic); Vazquez v. Werner Continental, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 513, 514-15
(N.D. Ill. 1977) (Mexican); Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786,
788-89 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Slavic); Sokolski v. Corning Glass Works, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 936, 937 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Slavic); Jones v. United Gas Improve-
ment Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Spanish-surnamed).
42. Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1981).
43. E.g., London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Chinese, characterized as racial minority); Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g,
Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Mexican-American, racial
prejudice based upon skin color); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d
1157, 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1976) (East Indian, discrimination claim characterized as
racial); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 436 (10th Cir. 1975)
(Chicano, whether plaintiffs had "standing" on racial or national origin grounds not
discussed), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Scott v.
Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975) (American Indians,
same); Naraine v. Western Elec. Co., 507 F.2d 590, 591, 593 (8th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (East Indian Hindu, permitted to demonstrate racial discrimination but
failed to do so); Alvarado v. El Paso Indep. School Dist., 445 F.2d 1011, 1011 (5th
Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Mexican-Americans, discrimination claim both racial and
"ethnic"); see Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F. Supp. 386, 392 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (Arabian, born in Iraq); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302, 304 (W.D.N.Y.
1980) (Pakistani Muslim); Maldonado v. Broadcast Plaza, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 839, 839-40 (D. Conn. 1974) (Spanish-surnamed); Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union No. 638, 326 F. Supp. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(Puerto Rican).
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may suffer "racial" discrimination, 44 and use a second approach under
which a claim of national origin discrimination survives a motion to
dismiss. 45 However, because national origin discrimination is consid-
ered actionable only to the extent it is motivated by, or indistinguish-
able from, racial discrimination, 46 these courts then require the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that the alleged discrimination was in fact based
upon race. 47 Under this approach, therefore, the plaintiff may be
required to demonstrate "racial animus," described by one court as
"discrimination based upon the perception by those who allegedly
discriminated [that the plaintiff] is a member of an identifiable racial
group different from white persons."' 48 Other courts require a plaintiff
who may be technically "Caucasian" to demonstrate that he has
objective racial characteristics-such as brown skin color. 4 Thus, an
allegation that Hispanics as a group are subject to racial discrimina-
44. See Naraine v. Western Elec. Co., 507 F.2d 590, 591, 593 (8th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Shah v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,803, at 25,756 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Pollard v. City of Hartford, 539 F. Supp. 1156,
1164-65 (D. Conn. 1982); Quintanilla v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 28 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1178, 1180 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp.
302, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Carrillo v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 830, 830 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1138, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 660 F.2d 1217
(7th Cir. 1981); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130,
452 F. Supp. 1127, 1142 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Puerto Rican Media Action & Educ.
Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,173, at 7792
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 13 n.10
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Maldonado v. Broadcast Plaza, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 839, 839-40 (D. Conn. 1974); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752,
755 (D. Or. 1973).
45. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 561 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see, e.g.,
Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Il. 1982); Saad v.
Burns Int'l See. Serv., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978); Martinez v. Ha-
zelton Research Animals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Md. 1977); Puerto Rican
Media Action & Educ. Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
10,173, at 7792 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
46. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977) (per curiam); Madrigal v. Certainteed Corp., 508 F. Supp. 310, 311 (W.D.
Mo. 1981); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
47. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 561 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 23, at 87-88.
48. Apodaca v. General Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.N.M. 1978); see
Madrigal v. Certainteed Corp., 508 F. Supp. 310, 311 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Lopez v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 801, 807 (D. Md. 1980); Enriquez v. Honeywell
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 906 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
49. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 561 (E.D. Cal. 1982); e.g., Carrillo
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Trehan v. IBM
Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 443, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Patel v. Holley
House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 383 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Vigil v. City and County of
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tion would not be sufficient.50 A Hispanic plaintiff would be required
to establish that as an individual he is considered "non-white" and was
discriminated against on that basis. 51
A third, "pragmatic approach," extends protection under section
1981 to groups that are commonly perceived, "however inaccurately
or stupidly,"52 as racially distinct and which have traditionally been
subject to group discrimination.5 3 The principal beneficiaries of this
approach have been Hispanics 54 because courts have concluded that
although Hispanics as a group may be technically "Caucasian," "skin
color, language, cultural differences and historical background are
persuasive reasons for classifying them as distinct from 'white citizens'
within the meaning of § 1981." 55
Denver, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8000, at 6938-39 (D. Colo. 1977); Gomez v.
Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D. Ariz. 1976); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp.,
420 F. Supp. 663, 666 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g,
Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Developments in the Law,
supra note 23, at 87-88.
50. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
see Martinez v. Hazelton Research Animals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186, 187-88 (D. Md.
1977). Courts recognize that the term "Hispanic" comprises a wide spectrum of racial
and ethnic backgrounds including Old-World Spaniards, New-World Indians, blacks
and mestizos of mixed ancestry, and thus courts require demonstration of distinguish-
ing "racial" characteristics. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 796
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
51. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
52. Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(dictum).
53. Id.; see Aponte v. National Steel Serv. Center, 500 F. Supp. 198, 202-03
(N.D. I11. 1980); Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134,
466 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Cervantes v. Dobson Bros. Constr. Co., 19
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8979, at 6085 (D. Neb. 1978); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyte-
rian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 263-64 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 660
F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135, 138-39 (N.D.
Ill. 1977). See generally 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 94.30 (discussing
the "pragmatic" approach and its origin).
54. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 94.30; see Greenfield & Kates,
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63
Calif. L. Rev. 662, 730-31 (1975) (arguing that Mexican-Americans are commonly
perceived as racially distinct, and should therefore come within § 1981's protection).
As noted in Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 559 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982), the
term Hispanic is only questionably descriptive. The courts, however, use the term to
describe a number of national origin groups, including Mexican-Americans and
Puerto Ricans, and therefore this Note uses this term to embrace the above groups.
55. Cervantes v. Dobson Bros. Constr. Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8979,
at 6085 (D. Neb. 1978); see, e.g., Aponte v. National Steel Serv. Center, 500 F.
Supp. 198, 202-03 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers, Local No. 134, 466 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyte-
rian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 263-64 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 660
F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135, 139 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(dictum). See generally 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 94.30 (discussing
the "pragmatic" approach's application to Hispanics).
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In contrast to these approaches, which construe section 1981 as
requiring some kind of racial test, a few courts reject this requirement
and instead recognize claims based solely on national origin discrimi-
nation. 56 These courts emphasize that section 1981 explicitly applies to
"all persons" and they decline to equate the "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" language of the statute with a racial classification. 7 Rather,
they construe the phrase as guaranteeing all persons the same rights as
the most favored class-historically, "white citizens."'5 Accordingly,
a section 1981 cause of action will be stated if a
plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of membership in a
group composed of both men and women, the boundaries of which
are not fixed by age or exclusively by religious faith, and which is of
a character that it is or may be perceived as distinct when mea-
sured against the group which enjoys the broadest [civil] rights. 59
This standard avoids the myriad of problems inherent in the racial test
invoked by other courts.
II. THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THE RACIAL TEST
A. The Test's Ambiguity and Impracticality
Use of a racial test "in political or judicial functions is fraught with
peril" 60 and for purposes of section 1981 leads to confusion because no
single judicial or scientific definition of "race" exists. 6' Indeed, the
56. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1979);
Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982); A1-Khazraji v. Saint
Francis College, 523 F. Supp. 386, 391-92 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Tayyari v. New Mexico
State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M. 1980); LaFore v. Emblem Tape &
Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978); see Samuel v. Virgin Islands Tel.
Corp., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,643, at 6700 (D.V.I. 1975); Sud v. Import
Motors Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Sabala v. Western
Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
516 F.2d 1251 (1975), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977);
1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 23 (quoting Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers Local Union No. 134, 466 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1979)).
57. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir.
1979); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 564 (E.D. Cal. 1982); LaFore v.
Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978).
58. LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo.
1978).
59. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
60. LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo.
1978); accord Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982).'
61. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211-12 & n.4 (1923); Ortiz v. Bank
of Am., 547 F. Supp 550, 565-66 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see also Young, Racial Classifica-
tions in Employment Discrimination Cases: The Fifth Circuit's Refusal to Prescribe
Standards, 11 Cum. L. Rev. 347, 349-50 (1980) (discussing lack of judicial standards
for delineating a racial class for purposes of class action certification). Compare Vera
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (discrimination
against Hispanics was not based on race) with Carrillo v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 18
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Supreme Court has failed to outline the scope of the racial discrimina-
tion prohibited by section 1981, while in another context it has com-
mented on the difficulty associated with assigning groups to "grand
racial divisions"62 based on a scientific definition of the term "race." It
stated that the word "white" was "to be interpreted in accordance
with the understanding of the common man, synonymous with the
word 'Caucasian' only as that word is popularly understood.
6 3
Therefore, although the Court acknowledged that an Indian Hindu
might be "racially" Caucasian,64 he was not considered "white' 65 for
purposes of a federal naturalization law.
66
In contrast to this expansive definition, many lower courts constru-
ing section 1981 appear to apply a narrower, objective standard in
determining whether the plaintiff has been discriminated against on
the basis of his "race."' 67 Underlying this objective inquiry, however,
are these courts' subjective perceptions of what constitutes racially
distinct characteristics.68 A further problem with this objective stand-
ard is that scientists themselves widely disagree over the proper classi-
fications of races.6 9 For example, depending on the authority con-
sulted, the number of races ranges from three to thirty. 70 Attempts at
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 830, 830 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("Because Mexican-Ameri-
cans constitute a separate race, plaintiff ... is protected by § 1981.").
62. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212 (1923).
63. Id. at 214-15.
64. Id. at 211. See generally Young, supra note 61, at 365 (explaining why both
fair-skinned Scandinavians and brown-skinned Hindus are properly classified as
Caucasian).
65. 261 U.S. at 214-15.
66. Acts of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, July 14, 1870, ch. 254, Rev. Stat. § 2169, 18
Stat. 380 (2d ed. 1878).
67. Young, supra note 61, at 349 & n.6; see, e.g., Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. &
Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff did not provide factual
support for the assertion that he is "Black"); Trehan v. IBM Corp., 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 443, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff must demonstrate that he is not
of the "white race"); Saad v. Burns Int'l See. Servs., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37
(D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff may not merely allege that he is "non-Caucasian"); Vera v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (although Hispanic
peoples generally have been subject to discrimination similar to racial discrimination,
this is not sufficient to constitute individual "racial" discrimination).
68. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("these cases
... reflect only conclusions ... based on faulty if unexpressed premises").
69. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212 (1923); see Ortiz v. Bank of Am.,
547 F. Supp. 550, 565-66 (E.D. Cal. 1982); LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co.,
448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978). But see Young, supra note 61, at 364-65
(suggesting that the term "race" is subject to scientific definition according to "an-
thropological norms" and proposing that courts use these norms so as to "lend
certainty to the present state of the law").
70. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212 (1923); Ortiz v. Bank of Am.,
547 F. Supp. 550, 565-66 (E.D. Cal. 1982). See generally S. Molnar, Races, Types &
Ethnic Groups 12-13 (1975) ("as few as three and as many as thirty-seven races have
been described" and noting that "one's classification usually depends on the purpose
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static classifications are also complicated by the fact that races evolve;
"some vanish, some new ones emerge and all change."' 71 In addition,
courts attempting to determine an individual's race based on scientific
classifications are likely to find themselves beyond their expertise 72
because their decisions will necessarily be based on complex anthropo-
logical data, including skull type, skin pigmentation, facial features
and blood traits.7 3
Although courts that do not apply an objective racial test have
avoided some of the pitfalls of this approach, they have encountered
other difficulties. For example, courts that find a national origin
claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, but subsequently re-
quire proof of "racial animus," have been constrained to note that the
line between race and national origin discrimination "may be so thin
as to be indiscernible. '7 4 One court in particular remarked that it is
"ironic that these cases which place the burden on plaintiff to prove
that the alleged discrimination was of a 'racial character' fail to
attempt to define the term 'racial' or to distinguish ... that term from
'national origin.' '' 75 Indeed, no court adopting this approach appears
of classification"); McBroom, Science on Race, in Human Variation: Readings on
Anthropology 233 (1971) (because races overlap, "creating a continuum," any at-
tempt at defining discrete categories of people is completely arbitrary).
71. LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo.
1978); see United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 212 (1923) (racial types may have
become "so changed by intermixture of blood as to justify an intermediate classifica-
tion"); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 567 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("the notion of
race is dynamic"); S. Molnar, supra note 70, at 4 ("Evolution is still proceeding ....
The composition of racial groups, as we define them now, will undoubtedly change
considerably."); Young, supra note 61, at 365 ("[R]ace is not static.").
72. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 562 n.19 (E.D. Cal. 1982);
LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978). For
example, as noted in Ortiz, courts that have dismissed claims by Hispanics because it
was assumed that they were not racially distinct in a scientific sense are "factually
wrong." 547 F. Supp. at 561 n.18. One scientific racial classification, in fact,
includes "Ladino," commonly known as Hispanics, as a distinct race. C.S. Coon, S.
Garn & J. Birdsell, A Study of the Problems of Race Formation in Man 138 (1950).
73. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 562 n.19 (E.D. Cal. 1982); LaFore
v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978). See generally
S. Molnar, supra note 70, at 46-77 (discussing some of the physical characteristics
that are used in classifying races: body size, head size and shape, brain size, face and
nose form, skin color. and blood traits); Young, supra note 61, at 365 & n.91 (listing
eight characteristics: skin pigmentation, stature, head form, facial structure, hair
color and texture, eye color and presence of eye fold, form of nose and body build)
(relying on L. Holmes, Anthropology: An Introduction 10 (1969)).
74. Enriquez v. Honeywell Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Okla. 1977);
accord Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 797 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302, 305 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Garcia v. Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1978), af-'d,
660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 666 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Godbolt v. Hughes Tool Co., 63 F.R.D. 370, 374 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
see Gomez v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D. Ariz. 1976).
75. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 562 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
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to have postulated an "authoritative and judicially manageable
method for distinguishing between national origin discrimination and
racial discrimination;" '6 in many cases the distinction may be so
blurred as to be meaningless. 77
Other courts, by allowing a plaintiff alleging national origin dis-
crimination to demonstrate his individual racial characteristics seem
to be assuming that certain national origin groups can be categorized
and identifiably distinguished solely on the basis of physical character-
istics. 7 18 "This is precisely the kind of stereotyping which the civil rights
statutes were designed to prevent. 79
Courts that adopt the "pragmatic approach" merely require that an
individual be a member of a group that is commonly perceived as
non-white and which has traditionally been the victim of discrimina-
tion. 0 Implicit in the pragmatic approach, however, is the assump-
tion that a common perception exists as to which groups are "non-
white" or racially distinct from whites. This supposition is
questionable because "race" is subject to great misuse and misunder-
standing, and therefore, it is doubtful that a common perception of
the term exists."' As commonly understood, race may be erroneously
thought to encompass "any more or less clearly defined group thought
of as a unit [usually] because of a common or presumed common
past." 8 2 For example, the people included within what is commonly
referred to as the "Aryan race" merely share a common language root,
76. Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 666 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In
addition, it has been pointed out that it is somewhat anomalous to rely on proof of
the perceptions of the discriminators in order to determine what kind of discrimina-
tion is at work, especially because the discriminators may be "poor anthropologists."
Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302, 305 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Man-
zanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979)).
77. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 566 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (because
"race" is partially defined on the basis of geographic distribution and culture-the
principal concepts of national origin-"no meaningful distinction can be drawn
between 'race' and 'national origin' ").
78. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining physical characteristics
used to identify a "race").
79. Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302, 305 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
80. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
81. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 566-67 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (relying on
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1870 (1976)); see Manzanares v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); S. Molnar, supra
note 70, at 12 ("Through overuse and vague application the term race has become
... encumbered with contradictory and imprecise meanings .... Many people
take for granted that they know what 'race' means and assume that scientific investi-
gation has long ago proved the existence of significant human racial differences-yet,
each time the term is applied, a definition must be provided so that the reader will
know what concept it represents.").
82. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1870 (1976); see A. Montagu,
Statement on Race 52 (3d ed. 1972).
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rather than common physical characteristics, and consequently do not
constitute a "racial" group at all.8 3
Even if it could be agreed that a group is commonly perceived as
"racially" distinct, this perception may change over time. 4 German
and Irish immigrants to this country were once thought by some
Americans to be "racially" inferior, as were Chinese, American Indi-
ans and Jews. 5 Absurd as it seems now, the alleged superiority of
Northern whites was even posited as the reason for the defeat of
Southern whites in the Civil War.86 Nevertheless, despite its attendant
ambiguities and impracticalities, the racial requirement has been per-
petuated by courts as a result of a strict reading of the language and
legislative history of section 1981 .87
B. The Language and Legislative History of Section 1981
When section 1981 was enacted after the Civil War, Congress
primarily intended to eliminate the disparate treatment of blacks in
the South 8 by undercutting the vitality of the "Black Codes." 9 Con-
sistent with both this purpose and its constitutional basis in the thir-
teenth amendment, 90 the original version of section 198191 extended
protection to citizens of "every race and color. ' 92 Doubts over con-
gressional authority under the thirteenth amendment's enforcement
clause to afford substantive rights9 3 prompted the introduction and
83. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1923).
84. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 567 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
85. Id.; see People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854) (the Chinese characterized
as racially inferior and "incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a
certain point"). See generally T. Gossett, Race, The History of an Idea in America
287-309 (1963) (discussing the characterization of various immigrant groups as "ra-
cially" inferior based on their origin).
86. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 567 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (quoting T.
Gossett, supra note 85, at 311).
87. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
88. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trum-
bull).
89. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Spiess v. C.
Itoh & Co. (Am.), 408 F. Supp. 916, 920 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
2951 (1982). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 37-43 (dis-
cussing congressional impetus for passage of § 1981).
90. U.S. Const. amend. XIII; see, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170
(1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
91. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
92. Id.; see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull).
93. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2. The authority of Congress to enact such
legislation has subsequently been confirmed by the Supreme Court. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
439-44 (1968).
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passage of the fourteenth amendment, 94 pursuant to which section
1981 was then reenacted.9 5
Although blacks were clearly intended as the primary beneficiaries
of section 1981, nothing in the legislative history or the statutory
language suggests that Congress intended to exclude from coverage all
other minority groups. 6 In fact, the author of section 1981, Senator
Trumbull, described it as designed "to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights."
'9 7
Despite the absence of any restrictive congressional intent, the
lower courts disagree whether the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens"98s should be interpreted to limit the scope of section 1981 to
racial discrimination claims. Some courts emphasize that the word
"white" indicates that protection is limited to claims based on color or
race."" Others suggest that the phrase was included merely because
white citizens enjoyed a numerical majority and superior legal protec-
tion in 1866, and thereby set the standard by which the civil rights of
all persons were to be measured.100 These courts suggest therefore that
today it should be interpreted as prohibiting the maintenance of any
favored class rather than as limiting claims to racial discrimination.'01
94. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436
(1968).
95. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968); Ortiz v. Bank of
Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Developments in the Law, supra note
23, at 46-47; see 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 88.10, at 18-5 to 18-6.
96. Alexican Americans, supra note 31, at 895; cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 289 n.20, 291 (1976) (no demonstration that the legisla-
tive history contradicts "the plain language" of § 1981 which was deemed to encom-
pass discrimination against whites).
97. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
99. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966); Jones v. United Gas Im-
provement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Kurylas v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 514 F.2d 894
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 60, 343 F. Supp.
70, 72 (E.D. La. 1972); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 5, § 94.10, at 20-12; cf.
League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636, 638-39
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (sex discrimination).
100. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 408 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); see, e.g., Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593
F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1979); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 563-64
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (quoting Manzanares); LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448
F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978); see also Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom; A
Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1974) (rights
possessed by white citizens became the yardstick by which all citizens' rights were to
be measured).
101. LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo.
1978); see Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Miranda v.
Clothing Workers, Local 208, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 557, 558 (D.N.J.
1974).
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The legislative history of the phrase can be read consistently with both
of these interpretations because members of the House and Senate
apparently attributed varying degrees of significance to the phrase. 0 2
The phrase was introduced as an amendment in the House by
Representative Wilson to "technically 'perfect' the bill."'' 0 3 Wilson
suggested that unless the qualifying phrase was incorporated, the
rights might be extended to "all citizens, whether male or female,
majors or minors." 0 4 Accordingly, it has been suggested that Congress
did not intend to include women or minors among "all persons." 105
This evidence of restrictive intent in the legislative history has also
been narrowly read as emphasizing "the racial character of the rights
being protected." 106 But as one court has noted, even if the legislative
history is correctly interpreted as excluding age and sex discrimination
claims, this conclusion does not necessarily imply that other forms of
discrimination, such as national origin discrimination, are also ex-
cluded. 10 7 In fact, upon section 1981's introduction in the House,
Representative Wilson explained that the statute was intended to
protect "every citizen" in the enjoyment of his civil rights and would
ensure that "one class shall not be required to support alone the
burdens which should rest on all classes alike."108
By contrast, some members of the Senate and the Senate Judiciary
Committee viewed the phrase as "superfluous."' 109 One Senator re-
marked: "[T]he idea is that the rights of all persons shall be equal; and
... the [statute] leaving out [the phrase], would attain the object."110
In light of some Senators' interpretation of the phrase as superfluous,
102. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 408 F. Supp. 916, 922-23 (S.D. Tex.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Mexican Americans, supra note 31,
at 894.
103. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 291 (1976); see
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115, 1117-18 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
104. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 app. (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson); see also id. at 1293 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) ("Your State may deprive
women of the right to sue or contract or testify, and children from doing the same.").
105. Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 99. In fact, the Supreme Court
has summarily stated, in dictum, that "§ 1981 is in no way addressed to such
categories of selectivity" as discrimination based on religion or sex. Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976). See supra note 33.
106. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 293 (1976) (quoting
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)).
107. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 555 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
108. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson) (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 1413 (exchange between Senators Van Winkle and Trumbull); id.
(Sen. Trumbull citing Senate Judiciary Committee's view that the phrase was super-
fluous); see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 294-95 (1976).
110. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866) (statement of Sen. Van
Winkle).
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it seems anomalous to construe it as affirmatively limiting the statute
to racial discrimination claims; courts should regard the phrase as an
expression of the standard by which all citizens' rights are to be
measured."'
Apart from this phrase, section 1981 by its terms broadly protects
"all persons.''12 It is therefore unlikely, based on the breadth of this
language, that Congress intended the protection to apply exclusively
to persons discriminated against on the basis of race." 3 Even though
the primary congressional purpose in 1866 was to protect blacks, the
language that has endured suggests a broader scope.
C. Congressional Impetus
Courts and commentators alike have questioned the propriety of
using "the immediate concerns of Congress over one hundred years
ago" to limit the scope of section 1981 today.' '4 These authorities
argue that section 1981 should be interpreted to effectuate those broad
principles of equality in civil rights that motivated Congress in 1866 to
come to the aid of blacks who, at that time, were the nation's most
oppressed group. ",Thus, the statute should be construed to apply to
111. LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo.
1978).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The language of § 1981 does not refer to race,
alienage or national origin but broadly applies to "all persons." Generally, civil rights
legislation is to be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. 3 C. Sands,
A. Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 72.05, at 392 (4th ed. 1974).
Accordingly, courts have stated that § 1981 is to be broadly construed. See, e.g.,
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 408 F. Supp. 916, 928 n.17 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds and re-
manded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Miranda v. Clothing Workers, Local 208, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 557, 558 (D.N.J. 1974); 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 20, at
35. But see Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("statutes in derogation of the Common Law, such as the Civil Rights statutes, must
be narrowly construed"). See generally 3 C. Sands, supra, § 72.05, at 391 (explaining
that among earlier decisions construing civil rights statutes, narrow interpretations
were not unusual and the same view is still found in some modern cases).
113. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 553 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
114. Id. at 555 n.7.; accord Miranda v. Clothing Workers, Local 208, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 557, 558 (D.N.J. 1974); Developments in the Law, supra
note 23, at 48-49, 68-69; see Levinson, New Perspectives on the Reconstruction Court
(Book Review), 26 Stan. L. Rev. 461, 483 (1974). In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976), Justice Stevens, concurring, who based his opinion that § 1981 prohibited
private as well as state discrimination on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), which held that § 1982 prohibited private discrimination, stated: "For even if
Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it
surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today." 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
115. Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 555 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see Harris
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 616 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980); Miranda v. Clothing
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the varied forms that group discrimination may take in society to-
day,11 6 even if they were not envisioned by the 1866 Congress.
The Supreme Court has adopted analogous reasoning in applying
section 1981 to whites who have suffered "racial" discrimination. " 7 In
analyzing congressional intent, the Court stated that "the statutory
structure and legislative history persuade us that the 39th Congress
was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle
than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and
immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.""" The Court
further stated that it would be unwarranted to limit this broad princi-
ple merely because discrimination against whites was unforeseeable
100 years ago." 9 Thus, it appears inconsistent to interpret the legisla-
tive history expansively for purposes of protecting whites from dis-
crimination, and yet use a restrictive interpretation to exclude protec-
tion of claims based on national origin.
D. Restrictive Interpretations of Section 1981's
Companion Statute: Section 1982
In limiting section 1981's protection to racial discrimination, some
courts emphasize that section 1982,120 a companion statute to section
1981,121 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as restricted to
racial discrimination and "does not address itself to discrimination on
grounds of... national origin."'22 Because the Court has stated that
the two statutes are to be construed together, 2 3 some courts hold that
section 1981 likewise does not address national origin discrimina-
tion. 12 4
Workers, Local 208, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 557, 558 (D.N.J. 1974),
Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 68-69.
116. See Allegretti, National Origin Discrimination and the Ethnic Employee, 6
Employee Rel. L.J. 544, 554-55 (1981) (discussing several studies, concluding that
various ethnic groups, such as Jews, Italians, Greeks and Slavs, continue to be
excluded from executive and middle-management positions because of discrimination
based on their national origin).
117. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976).
118. Id. at 296.
119. See id. at 295-96.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
121. See supra note 1.
122. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). Interestingly, an
executive order was recently issued under § 1982 directing all departments and
agencies of the executive branch to prevent discrimination in housing based on
national origin as well as race, religion or sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
123. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973) ("In
light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and § 1982, we see no reason
to construe these sections differently when applied, on these facts. ); accord
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976).
124. See Wald v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 616, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374,
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Because of several distinctions between section 1981 and section
1982, however, the two statutes have not been similarly construed for
all purposes. For example, by its terms section 1982 protects only
property rights while section 1981 protects a broad range of civil
rights. 1 25 In addition, section 1982 expressly applies solely to "citizens"
and therefore does not proscribe discrimination against aliens. 126 By
contrast, section 1981 applies to "all persons" and has therefore been
more broadly construed to protect aliens from discrimination. 27
These distinctions between sections 1981 and 1982 suggest that there
may be a basis for more readily allowing national origin discrimina-
tion claims under section 1981.
E. Section 1981 as Applied to Whites and Aliens
Some courts have held that groups asserting claims based upon any
form of discrimination to which whites may be subject, such as reli-
gious, sex or national origin discrimination, are not protected by the
statute. 12 These courts interpret section 1981 as protecting a person's
civil rights only "to the extent that such rights are enjoyed by white
citizens." 129 Accordingly, because whites may be subject to national
origin discrimination, the statute is thought not to reach such discrim-
ination. 30 Yet as recognized in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transpor-
382 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No.
130, 452 F. Supp. 1127, 1142 n.6 (N.D. Ii1. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Lamont v. Forman Bros., 410 F.
Supp. 912, 918 & n.28 (D.D.C. 1976); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68
F.R.D. 1, 12-15 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
60, 343 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. La. 1972).
125. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (right to purchase and
lease real and personal property) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (right to the full and
equal benefit of all laws). See generally Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportionate
Impact, supra note 3, at 141 (§ 1981 is significantly broader than § 1982 "because
contractual rights are implicated in many areas outside the context of property
transactions").
126. 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 39, at 70; 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note
5, § 97.20, at 20-54.
127. 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 21, at 35; 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note
5, § 97.20, at 20-52 to 20-53. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
128. Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 787 n.3 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (quoting Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa.
1975)); Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(same); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
see Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374
(1982).
129. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
130. Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 787 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(quoting Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975));
Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (same);
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tation Co., 13 1 whites may be subject to racial discrimination, and
therefore carrying this argument to its logical extreme would produce
an anomalous result: Racial discrimination would also not be pro-
tected by the statute.
Most lower federal courts have concluded that aliens who are dis-
criminated against solely because of their non-citizenship status state a
claim under the statute. 132 It seems analytically inconsistent, however,
to require citizens to allege racial discrimination under the statute and
yet allow aliens to avoid categorizing the claim as racial.133 Further-
more, this inconsistency is compounded when one realizes that citi-
zenship discrimination is often a mask for discrimination that is actu-
ally based on national origin. 134 For example, an employer may refuse
to hire both citizens and aliens of Mexican descent solely because of
their Mexican origin. 35 The Mexican-American plaintiff who cannot
prove racial discrimination will have his suit dismissed, but the Mexi-
can citizen will be allowed to proceed because of his alien status. It is
therefore conceivable that resident aliens, but not their American-
born children, would receive the protection of section 1981. This
Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).
131. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
132. E.g., De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F.
Supp. 1121, 1137 & n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 408 F.
Supp. 916, 928 n.17 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353, vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Jones v. United Gas
Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F.
Supp. 1042, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed as moot, 519 F.2d 403 (6th
Cir. 1975); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 536 (S.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); Dougall v. Sugar-
man, 339 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afJ'd on other grounds. 413 U.S.
634 (1973); see League of Academic Women v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 343 F.
Supp. 636, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 92.
But see Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp.
993, 1007 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (aliens can be protected under § 1981 if they were "the
victims of racial or other forms of discrimination actionable under [the statute]");
Baca v. Butz, 394 F. Supp. 888, 890 n.2 (D.N.M. 1975) (aliens who are discrimi-
nated against based on their race are protected); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note
21, at 265 (aliens may have to prove racial discrimination).
133. See Sud v. Import Motors Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.5(a) (1982). The Title VII ban on national origin
discrimination is not violated when an employer refuses to employ all aliens, making
United States citizenship a requirement for employment. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973). However, Title VII "prohibits discrimination on the
basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the
basis of national origin." Id. at 92; see 29 C.F.R. § 1606.5(a) (1982).
135. Note, Civil Rights-Employment-National Origin Discrimination and Ali-
ens, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 128, 135 (1972-1973) (discussing Title VII).
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anomaly can best be resolved by construing section 1981 to apply to a
plaintiff who alleges discrimination on the basis of membership in a
group, not defined by sex, age or religion, which is perceived as
distinct when compared with the group which enjoys the broadest
civil rights. 3 This construction would include all claims of national
origin discrimination, whether specifically asserted by citizens or im-
plicitly providing the basis for an alienage-based discrimination
claim.
F. Exclusivity of the Title VII Remedy
Some courts have also justified the limitation of section 1981 to
racial discrimination claims by noting that victims of employment
discrimination based on national origin have a thorough remedy 37
under the express language of Title VII. 138 Consequently, it is argued
that there is neither need nor justification for "judicially legislating"
section 1981 beyond the race discrimination at which it is supposedly
directed. 139 This argument may rest in part on a reluctance to allow
plaintiffs to avoid certain procedural prerequisites to suit and limita-
tions on relief under Title VII which have no counterparts under
section 1981.140
136. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
137. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), afJ'd, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374
(1982); Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 789 (W.D. Pa. 1977). Under
Title VII, an employer is permitted, however, to discriminate on the basis of national
origin, as well as sex and religion, in those instances in which national origin is a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of [his or her] particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). The
statute does not allow for a bona fide occupational qualification based on race. 2 C.
Antieau, supra note 3, § 381, at 16.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
139. Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
140. Before a plaintiff may institute a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-20O0e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), he must file a timely charge of employment
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receive
and act upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue. See Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). For a general overview of the proce-
dural prerequisites to filing a charge with the Commission, see 2 C. Antieau, supra
note 3, §§ 482-497. Claims under § 1981 are not subject to the filing requirements of
Title VII. Furthermore, unlike the remedies available under Title VII, which are
limited to equitable relief, 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g) (1976), the remedies under § 1981
are both legal and equitable in nature. Carrillo v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 830, 830 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Thus, Title VII has been
construed as not authorizing either compensatory or punitive damages. 2 C. Antieau,
supra note 3, § 520, at 222. By contrast, such damages are recoverable under § 1981,
see id., and because such damages are legal in nature, a plaintiff is entitled to a jury
trial under § 1981, which is not available under Title VII. Carrillo v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 830, 830 (C.D. Cal. 1978); see 2 C.
Antieau, supra note 3, § 513. A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under
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However, Title VII does not, in fact, provide a thorough remedy
for all the instances in which national origin discrimination may arise.
First, by its terms Title VII is inapplicable to certain employers. 41
Furthermore, while Title VII is exclusively concerned with employ-
ment discrimination, section 1981's protection of the right "to make
and enforce contracts" has application beyond the employment con-
text. For example, other contractual relationships have been the sub-
ject of litigation under section 1981 in the following contexts: admis-
sions to hospitals, 142 labor unions 43 and private educational
institutions; 144 consumer transactions; 45 and the operation of private
and public parks.46
It is also argued that when Title VII was passed, if Congress had
wanted to redress the problem of national origin discrimination in
non-employment contexts, it could have easily amended section 1981
to expressly apply to national origin discrimination. 47 The legislative
history of Title VII, however, demonstrates that it was intended to
augment, and be co-extensive with, an individual's remedy under
section 1981.141 Thus, it was unnecessary for Congress to amend sec-
tion 1981. Accordingly, a plaintiff should not be foreclosed from relief
under section 1981 merely because he may have alternate relief under
Title VII.149
G. National Origin Discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1981 rests in part upon the fourteenth amendment because
it was re-enacted pursuant to that constitutional provision. 50 Accord-
§ 1981 need not demonstrate that he has pursued or exhausted administrative reme-
dies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before he may bring a
§ 1981 claim. Goss v. Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 968 (1977); 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 32, at 51.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
142. See United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969).
143. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134,
466 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Miranda v. Clothing Workers, Local 208, 10
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 557, 558 (D.N.J. 1974); Marshall v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union 60, 343 F. Supp. 70, 71 (E.D. La. 1972).
144. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 165 (1976).
145. See Cody v. Union Elec., 518 F.2d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(security deposits), rev'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
146. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 432-34
(1973).
147. Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
148. H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2137, 2154; S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1971);
see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
149. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
150. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948).
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ingly, included within section 1981's protective reach is discrimination
as a result of state action.' 5 ' The Supreme Court has historically
recognized that section 1981 and the fourteenth amendment are
"closely related both in inception and in the objectives which Congress
sought to achieve" 152 and further that section 1981 "puts in the form
of a statute what had been substantially ordained by the [fourteenth]
amendment."15 3
Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
arbitrary state classificati6ns based on either race or national origin
are considered "suspect," and are therefore subject to the highest
degree of judicial scrutiny. 154 Thus, because distinctions based on race
and national origin are considered equally egregious for purposes of
the equal protection clause,' 5 5 it seems inconsistent to construe the
fourteenth amendment to proscribe national origin discrimination in
all but compelling circumstances, 156 and at the same time read this
prohibition out of a statute that was adopted pursuant to its authority
and which was to give effect to its provisions. 57
CONCLUSION
The use of section 1981 as an effective means of redressing the
denial of civil rights has been hindered by the incorporation of the
151. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson,
supra note 5, § 88.10, at 18-5 to 18-6; see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948); 1 C. Antieau, supra note 3, § 19, at 34; cf. Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1948) (§ 1982 is directed at governmental action).
152. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as a whole); see Yiek Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (the fourteenth
amendment applies universally, without regard to race, color or nationality and §
1981 was accordingly enacted); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452, 495 (C.C.E.D. Ky.
1905) ("Section [1981] is as broad as the fourteenth amendment as to the persons
affected by it."), rev'd on other grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); see also Fraser v.
McConway & Torley Co., 82 F. 257, 259 (C.C.D. Pa. 1897) (construing the four-
teenth amendment to bar alienage-based discrimination by .reference to § 1981,
which was enacted to enforce the amendment, thus embracing not merely citizens
but "all persons"); In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 508-09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (construing the
fourteenth amendment to apply to every person whether "Christian or heathen,
civilized or barbarous, Caucasian or Mongolian" in light of § 1981, which was
enacted in "consonance" with the amendment).
153. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
154. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7, at 519, 524-25; see, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (racial classifications); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (ancestry or national origin classifications); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (racial classifications).
155. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 7, at 535, 549.
156. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
157. See C. Sands, supra note 112, § 72.05, at 393 (noting that § 1981 and the
fourteenth amendment have been interpreted in light of one another).
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"racial" test. Reference to section 1981's legislative history neither
compels the conclusion that a restriction on cognizable claims was
intended nor demonstrates that all groups other than racial groups
were to be excluded from protection. Because the term "race" is
susceptible to varying interpretations, the "racial" test, whether nar-
rowly or liberally construed, is unworkable and produces anomalous
results.
A statute that is broad in language should be broadly construed.
Section 1981's scope should not be determined on the basis of condi-
tions existing at the time of its passage in 1866, but rather, in light of
the varied forms that group discrimination takes today. To interpret
the statute otherwise leads to an unjust result: Whites and aliens may
maintain suits, but the national origin plaintiff is denied relief. Sec-
tion 1981 should be interpreted in light of its nexus to the fourteenth
amendment as treating discrimination on the basis of race or national
origin as equally egregious.
Lorilyn Chamberlin
